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Sirota: The Visual Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights

NOTE
THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT:
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE MORAL RIGHTS*
Janet Drew is an aspiring New York artist who has met with
limited success. Her specialty is sketching city-scapes with colored
pencils. As a standard practice, she often makes multiples of her
sketches, signing and numbering each one. After an exhibition at a
local art gallery she is approached by Sam Worth, mega-millionaire
owner of Worth Clothing Stores, a nationwide chain of contemporary
clothing stores aimed at a young urban market. He tells her that he
has fallen in love with one of her sketches, Autumn in Soho, and
would like to use it in his stores, which are all decorated with
various knick-knacks and works of art. When he inquires as to the
existence of multiples, she replies that this particularsketch intrigued
her so much that she has made 223 multiples. He is delighted, since
this will enable him to display one in each of his stores. Worth offers
Drew a larger sum of money than she has ever contemplated being
paid for her work, and she happily accepts his offer. The following
week; she receives a contractfrom Worth's attorney. Unable to afford
an attorney of her own, she simply signs the contract and returns it,
understanding that Worth will own the drawings and the copyrights
for those drawings. Six months later, long after Worth has purchased
the drawings, Drew is in a Worth Clothing Store when she sees her
work She is utterly shocked however when she sees that Val Ewe, the
Worth mascot, has been superimposed on her print, which still bears
her signature. Upon further investigation, she learns that the mascot
has been added to every single one of her prints, and is incapable of
removal without damaging the print. Outraged at what she believes to
be serious damage to her reputation, she seeks a legal remedy.
Fortunately for Drew, state laws do exist, as does a recently
created federal statute, which may provide relief for her. On October

* An earlier version of this Note received an award in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition, sponsored by The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
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27, 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
("VARA"). 1 Its passage was hailed by many as a triumph for the
American artist.2 Now, the United States provides a right common in
other parts of the world 3-a federal statute that protects the reputation and honor of authors4 of works of fine art by giving those
authors the right to stop various actions which physically affect their
creations, despite the fact that the author may no longer hold the
copyright for that particular piece of art. VARA would seem to be
the perfect sort of remedy for Drew; but if not, are there other
alternatives available? VARA is not particularly innovative-many
states have had similar laws in existence for some time.5 One such
statute exists presently in New York.6
To state the problem simply, VARA does not cover Drew's
situation, since its scope is restricted to works of visual art which are
defined, in part, as "a drawing... existing... in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author."7 Drew has created a limited edition of 223 multiples

1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411,
412, 501, 506 (Supp. HI 1992) [hereinafter VARA].

2. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Vsual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a
Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 947
(1990) [hereinafter Damich, Federal Moral Rights] (calling VARA a "victorious culmination"
and a -triumph of principle over moneyed interests").
3. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
4. The term "author," while customarily applied to written works, is used throughout
the Copyright Act, and this Note, to apply to all artists and creators of any subject matter
covered by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. I 1992).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
42-116t (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153-55 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp.
1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(A) (Michic
1992); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104 (Supp. 1991); RI. GEN. LAws § 5-62-3 (1987).
The California Statute, the oldest of the above laws, first went into effect on January
1, 1980. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987.
6. New York Artists Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney Supp. 1993) [hereinafter New York Act].
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The definition of a work of visual artin full is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear
the signature or other identifying mark of the author, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200
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and is therefore not covered by VARA. However, Drew would have a
cause of action under the New York Artists Authorship Rights Act
("New York Act"), the scope of which is broader, reaching "limited
edition multiples of not more than three hundred copies by that
artist" 8 But with a federal statute now in existence which deals with
moral rights for works of fine art, is the New York Act (and other
similar state laws) still valid, or has it been absolutely preempted by
VARA?
This Note examines the Visual Artists Rights Act,9 the New
York Artists Authorship Rights Act,1" and the preemption doctrine as
it applies to these laws," concluding that in Drew's case, the New
York Act should not and probably would not be preempted by
VARA. Furthermore, state laws dealing with moral rights or any
similar rights should not be preempted insofar as they exceed the
scope of VARA.
I. VISUAL ARTISTS RiGHTS ACT OF 1990
VARA was passed on the last day of the 101st Congress as part
of a larger bill authorizing eighty-five new federal judgeships."
Representative Robert Kasteuneier and Senator Edward Kennedy
introduced two moral rights bills, H.R. 2690,13 and S. 1198.14 Senator Kennedy had been supporting the bill for years, and it had

copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audio visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container,
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
8. New York Act § 14.03.1.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-63.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 64-81.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 82-105.
12. George C. Smith, Let the Buyer of Art Beware; Artists'. Moral Rights Trump
Owners' Property Rights Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, TnE REcoRDER, Jan. 10, 1991,

at 4.
13. H.RL 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
14. S. 1198, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
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5
finally been passed by the House of Representatives. Facing opposition in the Senate, the bill was passed primarily due to its linkage
with the larger bill creating new judgeships, which the Senate was not
about to oppose. 6
The creation of VARA was no doubt made easier in part by the
United States' accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works on March 1, 1989.17 Despite the
lengthy history of the Berne convention, dating back to 1886,18 the
United States chose not to join this international union until recently.
One of the most difficult ideas for the United States to accept in
9
acceding to the Berne Convention was the concept of moral rights.
The term is a literal translation of the french term droit moral, a right
of authors that has existed in many other countries for quite some
time.20 It is a right of personality, separate from economic and property rights.2 ' Based upon the notion that a work of art is more than
15. Smith, supra note 12, at 4.
16. Id
17. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, reprinted In
PAUL GOLDSTEIN ET AL, SELECTED STATITES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT 315 (1991). [hereinafter Berne Convention] was first signed in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland, creating the Berne Union. It has subsequently been completed and revised seven times in 1896, 1908, 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967, and
most recently in 1971 in Paris. The Union now has more than seventy-five nation members.
For the purpose of this discussion, article 6bis of the Paris text is relevant:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
Id
18. Id
19. See, e.g., Glenn Groenewold, Congress in Action; Copyright Legislation, UNIX
REVIEW, Aug., 1989, at 28 (referring to moral rights as running "directly counter to
Americans' cherished belief in the moral supremacy of the pocketbook" and resistance to
joining Berne based upon opposition to the notion of artistic rights); Herbert Mitgang, Old
Copyright Treaty: New Shield for U.S. Artists, N.Y. TWEs, Mar. 10, 1989, at 7 ("[O]ne of
the issues that prevented the United States from joining Berne was this clause in the treaty
that protects the 'moral rights' of authors and artists.").
In fact, the decision by the United States to ultimately join the Beme Convention was
not motivated so much by a desire to provide moral rights, but was primarily motivated by a
desire to more easily prevent piracy of copyrighted American works outside of the United
States. Groenewold, supra.
20. Among them: Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey. See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUsICAL,
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 737-44 (5th ed. 1990).
21. See Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Compara-
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a mere chattel, droit moral is the right of an author to protect a
work-essentially a piece of the author-from unauthorized treatment,
even after relinquishing economic and property rights.'
While the concept of moral rights has existed in the United
States in the form of state statutes for several years,' it is likely
that VARA would not have been passed were it not for the Berne
Convention.24 Implicit in the United States joining the Berne Convention was the notion that the accompanying philosophy of moral
rights embodied in article 6bis would be accepted by the United
States. 25 Congress did not change the Copyright Act to comply with
article 6bis, but stated that moral rights were already protected in the
United States, and thus there already existed adherence to the Berne
Convention. 26 Despite this assertion, moral rights advocates have
continued to push for federal laws which provide more thorough
compliance with the Berne Convention.27 The passage of VARA
would suggest that the earlier statement that United States law already
provides for full moral rights is not entirely true, otherwise VARA

tive Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1748-49 (1984) [hereinafter Damich, A Comparative
Critique]; Thomas I. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 317, 318 (1989); Sidney A. Diamond, Legal Protectionfor
the 'Moral Rights' of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 245 (1978);
Sarah Ann Smith, Note, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection
and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 161 (1984).
22. See supra note 17.
23. See supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) [hereinafter RECORD]
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (Congress began its examination of authors' rights with the
Berne Convention).
25. The Preamble of the Berne Convention states that "the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
having presented their full powers, recognized as in good and due form, have agreed as
follows . . . ." GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 17, at 311.
26. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988); see also Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1989: Hearings on H. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter VARA House Hearings] (opening statement of Rep. Kastenmeier);
William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, in 1 OMNInUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Study No. 4 at 128-29 (George S. Grossman, ed. 1976).
In addition, once the United States had joined the Berne Convention, Congress stipulated that the Berne Convention's provisions regarding moral rights would not be enforceable
in the federal courts until Congress had passed legislation granting similar rights in American
authors. Groenewold, supra note 19, at 28.
27. See, e.g., Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1989) [hereinafter VARA Senate Hearings] (Congress should acknowledge
that providing moral rights for a segment of authors neither fulfills U.S. Berne obligations
nor provides comprehensive protection).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:461

would be superfluous. 8 It also suggests that there may be a future

of increased federal moral rights protection, perhaps for other classes
of works.
For the purpose of analyzing the Drew hypothetical, VARA
sections 106A and 301(f) are the most important.29 Section 106A
provides that the author of a work of visual art shall have the right

to claim authorship of that work, to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create, and to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work in the event of any modification when to do so would be

prejudicial to the author's reputation-this is known more simply as
the right of attribution." Section 106A also provides the more con3
right "to prevent any intentional
troversial right of integrity"-the
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional

distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of
that right."32 The right of integrity also includes a provision allowing

28. Most probable is that prior to the passage of VARA, there was a minimal level of
moral rights protection in this country, but far less than the levels of protection offered in
other countries. Between state statutory schemes, common law theories, copyright law, and
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, many remedies are available for limited moral rights
violations. The difference is that with VARA, there now exists a nationwide floor for moral
rights protection, at least as regards works of visual art. Cf. RECORD, supra note 24, at
H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmcier) ('While our laws may be sufficient to comply with
Berne, this does not necessarily mean that they are sufficient for all purposes.").
29. .17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 301.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)-(2).
31. The right of attribution is generally more palatable because it does not interfere with
private ownership. Cf. Smith, supra note 12 (VARA "imposes an artist's lien on [works of
visual art]-and thereby represents an unprecedented incursion on property rights").
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). Unfortunately, this clause is not entirely clear in its meaning. There are two salient interpretations: (1) An author can prevent an intentional alteration
before the fact if it will be prejudicial to her honor or reputation, and this right is violated if
an intentional alteration has already occurred, regardless of prejudice to honor or reputation
(this is what the statute seems to say on its face); or (2) An author can prevent an intentional alteration before the fact if it will be prejudicial to her honor or reputation, and this right
is violated if an intentional alteration has already occurred and that alteration is prejudicial to
the author's reputation or honor. The latter interpretation, while not as readily apparent on the
face of the statute, makes far more sense. If the former interpretation prevails, then one can
envision a situation where an author could act against alterations which have already occurred, if those alterations are not prejudicial, but could not stop those same changes before
they occur. Furthermore, the former interpretation creates protection for authors in situations
where their honor or reputation has not been damaged-a primary consideration in the area
of moral rights and under the Beme Convention.
For the purposes of this Note, I will assume that interpretation (2), which requires
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an author to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.33 Of paramount importance to Janet Drew is the definition of a
"work of visual art," which includes "a ... drawing ...

exist-

ing... in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed
and consecutively numbered by the author .... ."'
To summarize, VARA provides a right of integrity and a right of
attribution which apply only to works of visual art. It does not
provide equivalent protection to article 6bis of the Berne Convention.35 Beyond that which VARA provides, article 6bis provides: a
right of anonymity-the right to publish a work anonymously and to
stop anonymous publication; 36 a right of pseudonimity-the right to
publish under a pseudonym and to stop publication under a pseudonym; 37 and moral rights which last as long as economic rights
do.38 Most significantly, article 6bis applies to all works of art
produced by any author.39
The most fundamentally unique aspect of VARA in the context
of the Copyright Act is that it provides protection for the reputation
of an author, apart from whatever economic rights that author may or
may not possess. 4 Traditionally, the Copyright Act has provided
only economic rights, and protection of an author's reputation does
not qualify as such.4 1 The copyright laws' grant of power is derived
from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.42 This is significant in that the primary function of the Copy-

prejudice to honor or reputation, would be followed. If in fact, interpretation (1), which does
not require any impact on honor or reputation, proves to be what is truly intended, than most
of the arguments in this Note apply with even greater force. See infra note 112.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). This sort of provision runs contrary to the concept of
moral rights, which are supposed to protect all authors. See Berne Convention art. 3, in
GOLDSTEN, supra note 17, at 313; see also Smith, supra note 21, at 173 (courts should not
be called upon to determine whether art is of "recognized quality").
34. See supra note 7.

35. See Damich, Federal Moral Rights, supra note 2.
36. See GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 17, at 315 (article 6bis).
37. Id
38. Id Under the Copyright Act, for works created today, economic rights last for the
life of the author plus fifty years, while the moral rights provided by VARA last only for
the life of the author. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d), 302.
39. See GOLDSTMN ET AL., supra note 17 at 311-13 (articles 2 & 3).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
41. See RECORD, supra note 24, at H3115 (statement of Rep. Markey) (moral rights
"with their non-economic, subjective underpinnings do not fit neatly within our copyright
act").
42. U.S. CONST. arL 1, § 8, cl.8 states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
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right Act, as dictated by the Constitution, is to promote the sciences
and the arts. The United States has traditionally chosen to perform
this function, in part, by providing limited economic rights to authors.
The protection of authors' rights as individuals is a means to achieve
an end-the end being the societal good which is produced by flourishing arts and sciences. Quite the opposite, the purest model of
moral rights, the Berne Convention, protects the author first and
foremost, without regard for the balance of society.4 3 Arguably, by
protecting authors-thereby giving them a greater advantage in the
marketplace-it would follow that the arts on the whole would
improve and society would benefit, but this is by no means either a
certainty or a necessity.
VARA is a difficult law to categorize. While it seems to provide
moral rights, nowhere in the statute is that term used. Some see
VARA as a law intended to protect works of art from physical
changes which would essentially cause the loss of a particular work
of art-not a moral rights law so much as a preservation law.4'
Others see VARA as a law which primarily protects the personality
of the author, a true moral rights law.45 Whatever Congress' true
intention was in passing VARA-to preserve works of art or to

and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Ma.
43. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. Clearly, a pure moral rights statute,
which is not intended necessarily to benefit society as a whole, might be perceived by some
as an inappropriate law to be included in American copyright law, which is based upon
serving the public good.
44. See, e.g., VARA Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 77 (statement of Robert
Gorman, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law) (supports VARA to
the extent that it limits or focuses its concern to the destruction or mutilation of singular
works of art, which creates the risk of being removed from view in their original form);
REcORD, supra note 24, at H3114 (statement of Sen. Moorehead) (stating the purpose of
VARA as being to preserve and protect works of visual art without interfering with the rights
of copyright owners); id at H3116 (statement of Rep. Brooks) (VARA "recognizes the
influence in our culture of the work of visual artists and the need to protect that work"
(emphasis added)).
45. See, e.g., VARA Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 31 (statement of Edward J.
Damich, Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law) ("The phrase
'honor or reputation,' found in both article 6bis of the Berne Convention and in the Kennedy
bill also suggests an American connection to moral rights."); VARA House Hearings, supra
note 26, at 32 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) ("Moral rights are personal
to the author and are intended to protect the personality and integrity of the author, not
necessarily the work itself."); cf. id at 80 (statement of Jane C. Ginsburg, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law) (recognizing reputation as fundamental
concern of VARA, "[o]ne may speak of these interests as corresponding to moral rights but
they also have important economic consequences").
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protect authors' reputations-the result is clear. Authors of works of
visual art now enjoy a protection never explicitly provided for in
American law, and the best label we have for it is a moral rights
law.
Some are troubled with the concept of VARA being at odds with
traditional notions of property law.46 It is argued that forcing the
owner of a piece of fine art to respect the integrity and attribution of
the author infringes on Constitutional property rights by placing an
affirmative duty upon an individual who should be allowed to do
whatever he or she wants to do with that piece of property.4 7 The
right of property and the right of personality may clash, but the latter
must prevail. The former involves a mere piece of inanimate matter,
while the latter involves a human being.48 Furthermore, the protection of a person's personality is not a new concept inAmerican law,
and is therefore not novel or unusual. 49 A piece of fine art may be
a piece of personal property, but more than any other kind of property, that art is inextricably bound up with the personality and reputation of its author. Common sense dictates that when one buys a
painting, it is not merely a pretty picture, but an extension-a
part-of the author."° In effect, one is buying a part of that human
being, and certainly that individual is entitled to have their vision and
personality preserved, even if it does infringe upon the property rights
of the owner.51 If a newspaper article quotes a statement made by

46. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 4 (VARA "constitutes one of the most extraordinary realignments of private property rights ever adopted by Congress"). But cf. VARA House
Hearings, supra note 26, at 80 (statement of Jane C. Ginsburg, Associate Professor of Law,
Columbia University School of Law) ("I believe that the bill's solicitude for the interest of
owners is so great that if there is an imbalance, the disfavored parties are the artists").
47. See Smith, supra note 12 at 4.
48.

The piece of art itself may merely be inanimate matter, but the reputation and

personality embodied within that work concern a human being. See RECORD, supra note 24,
at H3115 (statement of Rep. Markey) (noting that: a work of art is too often simply treated
as a physical object, rather than as an intellectual work; that title to the soul of an artwork
does not pass with the sale of the artwork itself; and, that a work of artis not a utilitarian
object like a toaster).
49. See VARA Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 28 (statement of Edward J.Damich,
Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law) ("The torts of violation of the right of privacy and defamation per so are examples of causes of action that
protect the plaintiffs interest in his 'honor,* an aspect of the right of personality.").
50. Just try to imagine someone willingly paying millions of dollars for an exact replica
of a Picasso painting. When a collector does pay millions for an authentic Picasso painting,
they are clearly not just interested in the 'pretty picture" on the canvas, but in the author of
that work.
51. See, eg., Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (a
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some individual, the newspaper presumably holds a copyright to that
article and consequently "owns" that quotation. But the paper must
still accurately represent those words to the public. The words cannot
be intentionally altered so as to change the meaning of the statement
and then presented to the public as the words of that individual. Just
as the newspaper must accurately quote that individual's statement, so
should the owner of a work of art have an obligation to honestly
communicate that aspect of an author's personality to the public.
The legislative histories accompanying VARA indicate that
Congress had several major themes with which it was concerned. One
was a need for uniformity. 2 Congress already had stated that moral
rights protection existed to some degree in the United States under
various state laws, common law, and federal fair trade law.5 3 This
left authors with a great deal of uncertainty regarding their rights as
they moved from state to state.' Indeed, the Copyright Office has
made clear that a single federal system is preferable, because creativity is stimulated more effectively on a uniform nationwide basis.5
Congress was also interested in the precedential value of VARA,
especially in terms of an incremental approach to federal moral
rights.' Protection of authors who create fine art is a good starting
point for federal moral rights legislation for several reasons. Works of
visual art usually only involve one individual, not a collaborative

buyer of rights to a literary production cannot make as free use of those rights as a buyer of
a barrel of pork). In addition, any infringement upon property rights which may exist would

be minimal. VARA does not require an owner of art to exercise any extraordinary care or to
assume the role of a caretaker. At most, VARA would force an owner of a work of art to
restrain himself from altering that work should he desire to do so. VARA only prevents
intentional mutilation. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
52. RECORD, supra note 24, at H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (one of the goals
of VARA is to provide a nationwide standard for these protections and to provide uniformity
and certainty).
53. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
54. VARA House Hearings, supra note 26, at 28 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights) (visual works of art are not bound to any one location and different laws among
states presents questions of conflict of laws, vesting, and more).
55. Id.
56. See RECORD, supra note 24, at H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("We will
continue to consider whether claims arising in the film context meet the same standards as
visual artists' claims did."); VARA House Hearings, supra note 26, at 71 (statements of Rep.
Kastenmeier and Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) (discussing precedential value of
VARA). But cf. RECORD, supra note 24, at H3115 (statement of Rep. Fish) ("This legislation
should not be viewed as a precedent for the extension of so-called moral rights into other
areas.").
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team acting under the supervision of a studio or publisher, and are
therefore easier to assign to the creative talents of one author, which
makes enforcement of VARA far more simple than if these other
classes of work were involved. Also, works of visual art typically do
not involve the complex contractual matters which are commonplace
in other entertainment related industries, such as film or television,
and Congress is understandably reluctant to interfere with well established contractual arrangements within the entertainment industry.
Finally, the conduct forbidden by VARA has little, if any, redeeming
social value. As pointed out by Representative Kastenmeier in the
debates over VARA, "No one testified that these practices were
legitimate, or that they should continue.""' Ralph Oman, the Register
of Copyrights, described VARA as a "trial horse" for possible future
legislation protecting authors of other classes of work.5"
One of the most powerful reasons for enacting VARA is the
special nature of the class of works which it protects. Even opponents
to a federal system of comprehensive moral rights protection recognize the merits of VARA: the changes which might be wrought upon
a work of fine art, especially works existing in one form only, are
essentially destruction and the irrevocable loss of a piece of art.59
For this reason, these sorts of works are at a greater risk of loss than
a mass produced piece of art, such as a film, song, or book."
Above all, VARA was passed (as opposed to any similar statute
providing moral rights for other classes of work) because it was the
easiest to pass, with the fewest opponents and the most supporters. If
preventing the irrevocable loss of a work of art is one of the key
motivations behind VARA, why extend protection to multiples of not
more than 200 copies, or only to those photographic images produced
solely for exhibition purposes? Why not extend protection to books or
films before they have been mass produced or published? Perhaps the
notion of the struggling artist, eking out an existence at the mercy of
the buyer of artwork, engenders more sympathy than a team of
collaborators working on a film, or a writer working for a publisher.

57. RECORD, supra note 24, at H3113.
58. See VARA House Hearings, supra note 26, at 71.
59. See VARA Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 77 (statements of Robert A. Gorman,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and Edward Damich, Associate
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law).
60. See VARA House Hearings, supra note 22 at 27 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register
of Copyrights) (works of visual art present special challenges to copyright law because they

are neither mass produced nor mass distributed).
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If VARA seeks to protect the reputation of the author, why is struggling artist Janet Drew more worthy of protection than the director of
a black and white film trying to prevent the colorization of her work?
Works of visual art are especially receptive to moral rights legislation
for two reasons: 1) the romantic notion of protecting the struggling
author of "fine art" as well as the protection of that very work, and
2) a lack of big money opposition to protection of works of visual
art.6 ' As to the first reason, it is easier to feel a need to protect a
lone sculptor or painter than a team of collaborators working on a
film, or a writer, who may be alone, but is supervised and supported
by a publisher. It may be a bit much to say that the author of fine
art is more worthy of pity, but it is certain that our society can
sympathize more readily with the single individual who is taken
advantage of than with a film studio or publisher. As to the second
reason, the likely opponents to moral rights protection in other areas
such as film or written works-publishers, film studios, and network
and cable television companies-would have far more power and a
much greater interest in preserving what they might see as an advantageous position.62 The likely opponents to VARA-individual citizens, museums, and perhaps a few art magazines-are probably not
as fervent in their opposition to this kind of legislation and do not
have the lobbying strength which entertainment moguls possess.63
Simply put, VARA is a palatable moral rights law which serves to
appease those who argue that the United States has not done enough

61. It is worth noting that economically, VARA will probably have limited impact on
the industries which must deal with it. See RECORD, supra note 24, at H3113 (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier) (state laws already in existence have not disrupted the market for the sale
of works of art). Conversely, similar rights for other classes of works, such as motion

pictures or magazines, could have a negative impact on important American industries. See Id
at H3114 (statement of Rep. Moorehead) (moral rights for works which are collaborative in
nature and exist in large numbers would inhibit the dissemination and production of such
goods); id at H3115 (statement of Rep. Fish) (supporting VARA because it does not impact
on important activities of highly successful copyright industries, several of which contribute a
surplus to the U.S. trade balance, a factor of great importance in this era of staggering U.S.
trade deficits).
62. For example, if moral rights existed in other areas such as film, television networks
would be unable to edit works without the consent of the author, even though they would
hold a copyright for a work (and therefore have the right to prepare derivative works). See
generally VARA Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 51-53 (statement of Robert Gorman,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law) (opposing comprehensive moral
rights in the U.S.).
63. See RECORD, supra note 24, at 3113 (statement of Rep. lCastenmeier) (stating that
no one in the visual arts community argued that protection of this sort was not necessary).
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to comply fully with the tenets of the Berne Convention.
11.

THE NEW YORK ARTISTS AUTHORSHIP RIGHTS Acr

The New York Act first went into effect on December 31,
1984. 64 While similar to VARA, it has several key differences. First,
and most significantly for Janet Drew, the act protects works of fine
art of a limited edition of not more than 300 copies, as opposed to

200 for VARA.65 The right of integrity contained in the act only
prevents alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification of a work
of art when the work is knowingly displayed publicly or published,

and is represented or reasonably regarded as belonging to the author,
and if damage to the author's reputation is reasonably likely to

result.'
VARA.

67

The right of attribution is essentially the same as in

Even before VARA was enacted, opinion was divided over
whether the New York Act was preempted by the Copyright Act.68

The eventual existence (before the enactment of VARA) of moral

64. New York Act § 14.03.1.
65. Id; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Fine art" means a painting, sculpture, drawing, or
work of graphic art, and print, but not multiples. "Limited edition" means works of art
produced from a master, all of which are the same image and bear numbers or other markings to denote the limited production thereof to a stated maximum number of multiples, or
are otherwise held out as limited to a maximum number of multiples. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aft.
§ 11.01.9-.10. Both of the above terms are used within the New York Act
66. New York Act § 14.03.1. This is a somewhat more concrete standard than the
ambiguous "prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation" contained in VARA. 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a). Also note that the New York Act does not provide any explicit protection against
destruction of a work, which VARA does. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
67. Cf. New York Act § 14.03.2(a); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). The only possible significant
difference between the two rights of attribution lies in the right to disclaim authorship of a
work. Under the New York Act, an author may only disclaim authorship of an altered work
when there exists a "just and valid reason." This is roughly equivalent to VARA's requirement that an author may only disclaim authorship of an altered work when failure to do so
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. The semantics of the two acts differ,
but the effect is nearly identical.
68. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding New York Act not preempted by Copyright Act); Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding New York Act preempted when right of reproduction involved); Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding New York Act preempted when right of reproduction involved); see also
Damich, A Comparative Critique, supra note 21, at 1738-39 (noting qualitative difference
between New York Act and Copyright Act, justifying non-preemption); Davis, supra note 21,
at 351 (suggesting prohibition on alteration of work is equivalent of derivative work right and
therefore preempted).
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rights laws in nine other states, would lend support to the notion
that these state laws were not preempted." Most persuasive is
Congress' assertion that Berne Convention obligations are fulfilled in
part by state moral rights statutes. 1 Congress would not have made
this assertion if it did not intend for those laws to have effect.
The overriding intent behind the New York act is to protect the
reputation of the author, not to protect the work.' This is most
clearly suggested by the fact that the right of integrity is only invoked when the work of fine art is publicly displayed or published.73 Under the New York scheme, it is entirely plausible that an
owner of a work of fine art could mutilate the work to the point of
destruction, but so long as the work was not displayed to the public,
this action would not be in violation, of New York law. Clearly, this
sort of incident does not serve to protect the integrity of the work,
but it is in accord with the notion of moral rights set out in article
6bis of the Berne Convention.74 In the purest sense, moral rights
only protect a work insofar as is necessary to protect the reputation
of an author. When modification of a work will not harm the reputation or honor of the author, moral rights should not be invoked to
preserve the work. Preserving the integrity of a work of art is not the
function of moral rights, but an entirely separate concept. Despite the
primary intention of protecting authors' reputations, the legislature
also realized and intended that the public would benefit, declaring that
the welfare of the public "will be promoted by giving further recognition to the arts as a vital aspect of our culture and heritage.""5 The
69. See supra note 5.
70. See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. 130 (holding that New York Artists Authorship
Rights Act does not conflict with the Copyright Act and is not preempted under the Supremacy Clause).
71. See supra note 26.
72. See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 137 (quoting ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM ON
ASSEMBLY BILL 5052-B); Damich, A Comparative Critique, supra note 21, at 1737, 41.
73. New York Act § 14.03.1. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), where the right of
integrity is invoked when there is prejudice to the author's honor or reputation. This is
extremely ambiguous and it is entirely possible that a court could determine that a situation
could exist where an alteration has not been published or publicly displayed but is still
prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation, a broader scope than under the New York
Act. In addition, VARA provides for prevention of destruction of works of recognized stature.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). Clearly, this has nothing to do with moral rights, since it is
impossible for a nonexistent piece of art to reflect upon an author's honor or reputation.
74. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 17, at 315. This is an excellent example of how
the so-called right of integrity, a term descended from the Berne Convention, refers to the
integrity of the author's reputation or honor, not the integrity of the piece of work.
75. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AF. LAW § 3.01 (McKinney 1984); see also Damich, A
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result is somewhat similar to the effect of the Copyright Act.7 6 It
would seem that the New York law incidentally serves the public
good, while the Copyright Act incidentally serves the author. Yet
isn't the end result quite similar, whatever the stated primary purpose
of these laws might be? Some argue that state moral rights laws, as
well as VARA, will in fact hurt the public.' But clearly, the various
legislators who have dealt with moral rights and related statutes must
have intended the best of both worlds-serving the public good and
protecting the honor and reputation of authors.'8 As we have observed of the Copyright Act in its history, it is possible for these two
concepts to coexist within one body of law, with great success.
From a pure moral rights standpoint, the New York Act is
superior to VARA. First, the New York Act does not protect against
destruction of any kind, as VARA does.79 Protection of the actual
work, apart from the author's reputation, is not the function of moral
rights law. Second, the New York Act is less ambiguously connected
to reputation on its face. The New York Act requires public viewing
or publication plus damage to the author's reputation." This is far
more clear than VARA's requirement that an alteration be "prejudicial
to [an author's] honor or reputation.""
I. PREEMPTION
The doctrine of preemption draws its authority from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.' Federal law is always supreme over

Comparative Critique, supra note 21, at 1750-51.
76. By giving limited economic rights to authors, the arts flourish and all of society
benefits. The New York Legislature apparently felt that by giving limited moral rights to
authors, the arts continue to flourish and all of society benefits.
77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 4 (VARA has been applauded by arts advocates
but "millions of ordinary Americans whose rights are now restricted are not likely to share
the enthusiasm").
78. See, e.g., RECORD, supra note 24, at H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (describing VARA as a bill that balances the rights of all interested parties, including authors
and copyright holders, and that also promotes the public interest).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
80. New York Act § 14.03.1.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
82. U.S. CONST. arLt.VI, cl.
2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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state law. 3 Reasons for having a doctrine of preemption include a
need for uniformity as well as a need for one supreme government
which binds the various states together. However, the Supreme Court
has made clear that the constitutional grant of power to Congress,
upon which the Copyright Act is based, is not exclusive, and thus
under the proper circumstances, state laws may coexist with similar
federal laws in the area of copyrights.' This determination is premised upon the "great diversity of interests in our Nation-the essentially non-uniform'character of the appreciation of intellectual achievements in the various States." 85 Each state has its own particular
attributes which define it. New York, primarily due to the existence
of New York City, has evolved as a major cultural center in the
United States. 6 As such, the citizens of New York, as compared to
those of other states, have different needs and interests in the area of
arts and cultural affairs. It is logical to allow each individual state to
provide greater protection of those rights which are most vigorously
exercised by the citizens of that state. 7 Nonetheless, situations may
arise where a state law cannot be permitted to coexist with federal
law. State law may be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause in
several ways: 8

Id
83. Id
84. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (construing Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)).
85. Id. at 479.
86. For most people, the idea of New York (primarily New York City) as the arts and
cultural center of the United States is not open to dispute. See, e.g., FAYE HAMIEL,
FROMMER'S COMPREHENSIVE TRAVEL GUIDE: NEW YORK '91 201 (1991) ("New York City
is, of course, the entertainment capital of the nation."); Amy Hersh, Cultural Affairs Report
Shows NYC's Influence Across Country, BACK STAGE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 3 ('[A]rtistic pur."); NYNEX YELLOW
suits born in New York City travel the world, impact the world ...
PAGES (NYNEX Information Resources Co. ed., 1992) (listing 34 Broadway theaters, 43 OffBroadway theaters, 91 museums, 42 sculptors, and 148 theatrical agencies in New York City).
87. The Supreme Court in the case of Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973),
made a pertinent point regarding the need for the existence of state laws which are similar to
federal copyright laws:
[l]t is unlikely that all citizens in all parts of the country place the same importance on works relating to all subjects. Since the subject matter to which the copyright clause is addressed may thus be of purely local importance and not worthy
of national attention or protection, we cannot discern such an unyielding national
interest as to require an inference that state power to grant copyrights has been
relinquished to exclusive federal control.
412 U.S. at 557-78.
88. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
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First, Congress may in express terms declare its intention to preclude state regulation in a given area ....
Second, in the absence
of an express declaration, preemption may be implied when the
federal law is "sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementing state regulation"... Finally, state law may be preempted "to the extent that
it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute. " '
Since there is already good authority that the New York Act is

not preempted by the general preemption provision of the Copyright
Act, 9 it is only necessary to consider possible preemption under the
newly amended preemption provision of VARA.9" That section reads
in pertinent part:
(1) ... all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of

visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A apply are
governed exclusively by section 106A ....

Thereafter, no person is

(1985); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983); G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Sere., Inc., No. 90-56010, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3654 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1992); Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 985
(2d Cir. 1989).
89. Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Puerto
Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 497-98 (1988);
International Paper Co. v. Quellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
90. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also Wojnarowicz v. American
Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135-36 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding claims under New
York Act (prior to VARA) not preempted by Copyright Act); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood &
Sons, 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1532 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that federal law does not
protect ideas, so state laws that protect ideas, as opposed to their expression, are not preempted by (pre-VARA) Copyright Act); Damich, A Comparative Critique, supra note 21, at
1739 (noting the qualitative difference between New York and federal law, since state statute
aims at protecting reputation, a species of tort law traditionally reserved to the states). But cf.
Davis, supra note 21, at 351 (suggesting prohibition on alteration of work appears to be
equivalent to derivative work right and is therefore preempted).
91. The task of determining whether state law is preempted by VARA in situations
other than those similar to Janet Drew's situation will undoubtedly be no easy job. See
Charles Ossola, Law For Art's Sake; Copyrights on the Integrity of Artists' Works will
Prevent Mutilation or Denigration of Their Creation, THE REcORDER, Jan. 8, 1991, at 6
(VARA's preemption provision "will occupy courts for years to come.., judges will be
writing the law on preemption case by case").
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entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any work of visual
art under the common law or statutes of any State.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to...
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that
are not equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section
106A with respect to works of visual art ....
This then, is Congress, "in express terms declar[ing] its intention to
preclude state regulation in a given area." 93 Technically, the New
York Act, as applied to Drew's situation, is not preempted in this
respect. The New York Act does provide a legal or equitable right
equivalent to the rights conferred by section 106A.' However, section 301(f) of VARA speaks in terms of "works of visual art" and
the rights which affect them. Referring to the definition section of the
Copyright Act, a "work of visual art" is "a painting, drawing, print,
or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author .... ."9 Under federal copyright law, Drew's multiple edition
drawing is not a work of visual art.96 The preemption provision only
forbids states from creating equivalent rights to those granted in section 106A for works of visual art. Technically, the New York Act is
not creating an equivalent right for a work protected by VARA. The
preemption provision of VARA should be construed just as narrowly
as it is plainly intended. Congress has clearly demonstrated in other
areas of the law that it is well aware of how to draft broad preemp-

tion statutes.97
The analysis does not end here, however. Congress has not ex-

92. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
93. Associaton of Am. Medical Colleges, 928 F.2d at 522.
94. It is important to remember, however, that a state created right need not be exactly
identical to the federal right in order to be preempted. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMEM, NIM9MR ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (1992).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added); see also supra note 7.
96. Simply because Drew's work may be considered -visual art" does not place it
within the scope of VARA. See Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Prod., Inc., No. 92 C 1055, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *11 (N.D. IMI.July 10, 1992) (holding VARA does not include
puppets, costumes or sets, which arguably might be considered -visual art").
97. Eg., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, No. 91-1326, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 7847, at *4, *5 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (holding ERISA's preemption provision is much
broader, "supersed[ing] any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA).
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plicitly declared that the New York Act is preempted by VARA in
Drew's case, but preemption may also be implied. The question now
is whether the federal law is "sufficiently comprehensive to make
reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementing state regulation." 8 The answer would seem to be no. First,
VARA, unlike the Copyright Act as a whole, covers a very narrow
class of works-works of visual art." The precise issue is whether
Congress, by enacting VARA, intended for the states to have no
authority in the realm of moral rights as concerns all authors and all
works of art, not just authors of works of visual art; whether Congress intended that all legislating concerning moral rights be exclusively vested in Congress. It would be illogical for VARA, a narrow
law addressing a minute fraction of all works of art, to preempt similar state laws which protect works other than those of visual art. As
stated earlier, Drew's work does not fall within the federal definition
of a work of visual art."° At the same time, it could be argued that
Congress has decided which works of art are entitled to moral rights
protection, and that to extend similar protection to other works of art
defeats Congress' intent to protect only a specific class of works.
This analysis would be similar to instances where state attempts to
extend protection equivalent to patent law protection to useful works
which do not meet federal patent guidelines have been held to be
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. 1' Nonetheless, given the
limited nature of VARA versus either the Copyright Act as a whole
or the Patent Act, Congress has not clearly occupied the entire field
of moral rights protection for the arts."°

98. Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
101. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Ughting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). But cf Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
571 (1973) ("Sears and Compco . . . have no application in the present case, since Congress
has indicated neither that it wishes to protect, nor to free from protection, recordings of
musical performances."). Just as in Goldstein, Congress has indicated neither that it wishes to
protect, nor to free from protection, the moral rights associated with works of art other than
works of visual art. In addition, Sears and Compco deal with patent law, while Goldstein
deals with copyright law. Since VARA is part of copyright law, Goldstein is a more persuasive case, as well as being on point to a greater degree.

102. This is borne out by that portion of the VARA preemption statute which explicitly
preserves certain rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any state. 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(O(2)(B). In addition, the view that VARA may serve as part of a federal incremental
approach to moral rights would support the concept that state laws which do not conflict
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The third type of state law preemption, conflict preemption,
occurs either when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, " ' °3 or where state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 1' It does not seem impossible for one
to comply with both VARA and the New York Act. Quite the opposite, the New York Act, utilized by Drew, would in no way run afoul
of VARA, but can more reasonably be considered as supplemental
protection. The second prong of this manner of preemption inquires
into the purposes and objectives of Congress. VARA's purposes, in
the most basic sense, are to protect the reputations of authors and to
preserve works of visual art. The New York Act in no way frustrates
these purposes, but merely expands upon them. The only way a state
statute would be an obstacle to VARA would be if it were to cut
back on the protections created in VARA, which the New York Act
does not do.
To summarize, technically there is no explicit preemption of the
New York Act by VARA as regards the Drew situation. Nor is it
likely that a court would find any implicit preemption of the New
York Act, or any conflict between it and VARA. If Congress ever
intends to extend moral rights protection to other classes of works, it
is essential for state laws dealing with these classes to be preserved.
New York state has chosen a broader definition of fine art. Just because Drew's work is awfully close to the federal definition of a
work of visual art does not take away from the fact that it is not
covered by VARA, and any state law which protects it is in no way
usurping VARA's objectives. The New York Act does overlap with
VARA, but this does not render it void under the plain meaning of
the preemption provision of VARA."°5

with VARA should continue to exist so that their efficacy may be observed. After all, VARA
would probably never have been enacted if Congress had been unable to draw on state
models of moral rights statutes protecting fine art; if Congress is in fact considering similar

legislation in other areas, it is essential that states be able to enact such legislation which
Congress can later draw upon in creating a federal statute.
103. Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
104. Id.(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
105. Many scholars have argued that the preemption provision of VARA should be
interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., Damich, Federal Moral Rights, supra note 2, at 947-48, 97273 (arguing that incrementalism and lack of generalized language as in § 301 justify a
narrow interpretation of the preemption provision); VARA House Hearings, supra note 26, at
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Janet Drew's use of the New York Act should not, and probably

would not, be preempted by VARA. New York State, being more
concerned with the needs of authors than most other states, has chosen to protect the reputations of authors of certain works of fine art.
Congress also has decided that authors of certain works of fine art
are in need of protection. Drew has created a limited edition series of
223 multiples, a work of art not protected by the federal law-in
fact, not a work of visual art as far as VARA is concerned."re New
York is protecting another class of work of art-a work of art unprotected by federal law. Any state is free to do this.1 7
Simply because the New York Act is preempted and void when
a plaintiff has a situation which fits within the scope of VARAre
does not mean that the New York Act is preempted absolutely for all
purposes. In Goldstein v. California,"°9 the Supreme Court held valid a state law which created equivalent rights to those provided in the
Copyright Act for material which was not copyrightable. The defendants had violated this law by pirating musical recordings and contended that they could not be convicted under this state law because
it was preempted by the Copyright Act."1 ' While the case was
pending, Congress amended the Copyright Act to provide those same
protections for those same materials, but it did not apply retroactively,
so the defendants could not be convicted of violating the new amendments."' The result was a state law which would be preempted by
the Copyright Act if it were to be applied to works covered by the

amendments, but not preempted, as was the case in Goldstein, if the
work was not covered by the amendments. Similarly, the New York
Act may be preempted in certain situations, but remain valid for

others.
The reasons for not preempting the New York Act when the
28 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) (If a State decides to grant greater
protection, it would not be preempted by this act. H.R. 2690 provides" only a minimum
threshold of protection and permits States to enact more expansive protection.").
106. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
107. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
108. For example, if Janet Drew had created a limited edition of 195 multiples, she
would have relief under VARA and could not sue under the New York Act because it would
be providing equivalent rights for a piece of art specifically covered by VARA, and therefore
preempted as directed under 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
109. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
110. Id. at 548-49.
111. IX at 551-52.
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work in question is not covered by VARA or when the rights provided by the state law differ from those provided by VARA are equally
forceful when applied to other state laws which create moral rights
for authors.112 Courts must take care to apply the preemption provision of VARA narrowly, as it is written. Only in this manner will the
individual states be free to enact the sorts of laws involving moral
rights which they deem important to their citizenry. If Congress is
indeed concerned with engendering more thorough and complete
compliance with the principles contained within the Berne Convention, courts should not take a step backwards by cutting off some of
the best methods available for obtaining relief for violations of moral
rights by making state moral rights laws obsolete. States which desire
to enact laws providing moral rights for authors of other classes of
works, such as film or literature, should be encouraged to do so, so
that Congress, by observing the effects of these laws, can determine
whether to create such rights at the federal level.
Brett Sirota

112. This applies to a greater degree in those states that have created laws which really
act more as preservation laws than as moral rights laws. The California law is a good
example of such a statute: "No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of
fine art which the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional
commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of
fine art." CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Notice that this statute does not
involve any consideration of an author's reputation, and also protects against destruction of
all works of fine art. Id Other states which have followed the California model include
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. For these states, the arguments against precmp-

tion are stronger because the laws involved are simply not as similar.
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